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Abstract
Cramer’s (1986) transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics posits retro-
causal influences in quantum processes in an attempt to alleviate some of the inter-
pretational difficulties of the Copenhagen interpretation. In response to Cramer’s
theory, Maudlin (2002) has levelled a significant objection against any retrocausal
model of quantum mechanics. I present here an examination of the transactional
interpretation of quantum mechanics and an analysis of Maudlin’s critique. I claim
that, although Maudlin correctly isolates the weaknesses of Cramer’s theory, his
justification for this weakness is off the mark. The cardinal vice of the transac-
tional interpretation is its failure to provide a sufficient causal structure to constrain
uniquely the behaviour of quantum systems and I contend that this is due to a lack
of causal symmetry in the theory. In contrast, Maudlin attributes this shortcom-
ing to retrocausality itself and emphasises an apparently fundamental incongruence
between retrocausality and his own metaphysical picture of reality. I conclude by
arguing that the problematic aspect of this incongruence is Maudlin’s assumptions
about what is appropriate for such a metaphysical picture.
Key words: quantum mechanics, transactional interpretation, retrocausality
1 Introduction
The merit of positing retrocausal influences in quantum mechanics is relatively well known:
explicit violation of the assumption of independence in the derivation of Bell’s Inequal-
ity resurrects the local hidden variables program of quantum interpretations. Positing
retrocausality in nature, however, is a somewhat unpopular proposal. One of the most
significant obstacles for retrocausal approaches to quantum mechanics is the objection lev-
elled at Cramer’s (1986) transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics by Maudlin
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(2002), who claims that his objection poses a problem for “any theory in which both back-
wards and forwards influences conspire to shape events”. This paper is an examination
of Maudlin’s objection to retrocausality.
The examination proceeds as follows. I begin in §2 with an introduction to Wheeler
and Feynman’s (1945) attempted time symmetric formulation of classical electrodynamics,
from which the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics originates. I then
introduce in §3 Cramer’s extension of the Wheeler-Feynman formalism to a retrocausal
transaction mechanism for modelling quantum processes. §4 sets out the details of the
transactional interpretation and I briefly mention there some of the advantages Cramer’s
theory has over the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics: most notably that
the retrocausal structure allows a ‘zigzag’ causal explanation of the nonlocality associated
with Bell-type quantum systems. In §5 I set out the details of Maudlin’s inventive thought
experiment that constitutes his objection to Cramer’s theory. I examine in §6 some
replies that have been made in response to Maudlin’s objection defending the transactional
interpretation.
In §7 I offer my own analysis of Maudlin’s experiment according to the transactional
interpretation with a view to showing that, despite the putative defences considered, there
is still a problem to be overcome. What is lacking in Cramer’s theory is a causal structure
that can constrain uniquely the behaviour of a quantum system and this is exactly the
problem that Maudlin’s experiment emphasises. I diverge from Maudlin, however, in the
justification for why the transactional interpretation suffers this shortcoming. I claim in
§8 that it is the failure of the transactional interpretation to ensure causal symmetry that
is impeding such unique determination of behaviour. In contrast, Maudlin attributes this
shortcoming to retrocausality itself and emphasises an apparently fundamental incongru-
ence between retrocausality and his own “metaphysical picture of the past generating the
future”. I present an argument that it is Maudlin’s assumption about the appropriateness
of this metaphysical picture that is problematic here, and not retrocausality.
2 The Wheeler-Feynman absorber theory of radiation
Our narrative begins with a problem of classical electrodynamics: an accelerating electron
emits electromagnetic radiation, and through this process the acceleration of the electron
is damped. Various attempts were initially made to account for this phenomenon in
terms of the classical theory of electrodynamics but largely these lacked either empirical
adequacy or a coherent physical interpretation. Wheeler and Feynman (1945) set out to
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remedy this situation by reinterpreting Dirac’s (1938) theory of radiating electrons. I will
make no attempt here to give an analysis of this problem, nor of its ensuing evolution.
What is important for our purposes is the nature of the interpretation that Wheeler and
Feynman proffer as a resolution, for it is this interpretation that is the motivation for the
transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The core of Wheeler and Feynman’s absorber theory of radiation is a suggestion that
the process of electromagnetic radiation should be thought of as an interaction between
a source and an absorber rather than as an independent elementary process.1 Wheeler
and Feynman imagine an accelerated point charge located within an absorbing system
and consider the nature of the electromagnetic field associated with the acceleration. An
electromagnetic disturbance initially travels outwards from the source and perturbs each
particle of the absorber. The particles of the absorber then generate together a subsequent
field. According to the Wheeler-Feynman view, this new field is comprised of half the
sum of the retarded (forwards-in-time) and advanced (backwards-in-time) solutions to
Maxwell’s equations. The sum of the advanced effects of all the particles of the absorber
then yields an advanced incoming field that is present at the source simultaneous with
the moment of emission. The claim is that this advanced field exerts a finite force on
the source which has exactly the required magnitude and direction to account for the
observed energy transferred from source to absorber; this is Dirac’s radiative damping
field. In addition, when this advanced field is combined with the equivalent half-retarded,
half-advanced field of the source, the total observed disturbance is the full retarded field
known from experience to be emitted by accelerated point charges.
The crucial point to note about the Wheeler-Feynman scheme is that due to the
advanced field of the absorber, the radiative damping field is present at the source at
exactly the time of the initial acceleration. Quite simply, if a retarded electromagnetic
disturbance propagates for a time t before meeting the absorber then the absorber will
be a distance ct from the source. The advanced field propagates with the same speed
c across the same distance and thus will arrive at the source exactly time t before the
absorber field is generated, i.e. at the time of the initial acceleration. If we think of this
four dimensionally (in block universe terms) it is clear to see that the advanced field does
1Such an idea was suggested, for instance, by Tetrode (1922) and also by Lewis (1926):
[A]n atom never emits light except to another atom, and. . . it is as absurd to think of light
emitted by one atom regardless of the existence of a receiving atom as it would be to think
of an atom absorbing light without the existence of light to be absorbed. I propose to
eliminate the idea of mere emission of light and substitute the idea of transmission, or a
process of exchange of energy between two definite atoms or molecules. (Lewis, 1926, p. 24)
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not simply propagate the same distance as the source field, it propagates across the very
same spacetime as the initial disturbance.2 It is this idea of time symmetric radiation
that is at the core of the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics.
3 The quantum handshake
Cramer’s (1986) transactional interpretation is a retrocausal model of quantum mechanics
that extends the Wheeler-Feynman formalism beyond electrodynamics. Cramer suggests
that the description of the emission and absorption of electromagnetic radiation in the
Wheeler-Feynman scheme can be adopted to describe the microscopic exchange of a sin-
gle quantum of energy, momentum, etc., between and within quantum systems. This
time symmetric interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism not only provides a
Lorentz covariant explanation of the nonlocal behaviour displayed by entangled quantum
systems but also constitutes an attempt to alleviate some of the interpretational problems
of the Copenhagen interpretation in general. Before we address how this is achieved, let
us consider the transaction mechanism at the core of the transactional interpretation.
Imagine a quantum emitter such as a vibrating electron or atom in an excited state.
According to Cramer, when a single quantum is to be emitted (a photon, in these cases) the
source produces a radiative field. Analogously to the Wheeler-Feynman description, this
field propagates outwards in all directions of four dimensional spacetime, i.e. in all three
spatial dimensions and both forwards (retarded field) and backwards (advanced field) in
the temporal dimension. When this field encounters an absorber, a new field is generated
that likewise propagates in all directions of four dimensional spacetime. The retarded
field produced by the absorber exactly cancels the incident retarded field produced by
the emitter for all times after the absorption of the photon. The advanced field produced
by the absorber propagates backwards in time across the same spacetime interval as the
incident wave to be present at the emitter at the instant of emission. The advanced field
produced by the absorber exactly cancels the advanced field produced by the emitter and
thus there is neither a net field present after the time of absorption nor before the initial
emission; only between the emitter and the absorber is there a radiative field.
Cramer describes the field that travels from the source to the absorber as an “of-
fer” wave and the field that returns from the absorber to the emitter as a “confirmation”
wave. The transaction is completed with a “handshake”: the offer and confirmation waves
2According to Price (1991), the fact that the retarded and advanced waves cross the same spacetime
indicates that they are in fact one and the same electromagnetic disturbance.
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combine to form a four dimensional standing wave between emitter and absorber. The
conditions at the emitter and absorber at the time of emission and absorption respectively
are the boundary conditions that determine whether or not a transaction can take place
and, if so, the probability of that transaction occurring. The amplitude of the confirma-
tion wave which is produced by the absorber is proportional to the local amplitude of
the incident wave that stimulated it and this, in turn, is dependent on the attenuation
it received as it propagated from the source. It is the boundary conditions at both ends
of the transaction that define when a transaction can be completed. A cycle of offer and
confirmation waves “repeats until the response of the emitter and absorber is sufficient to
satisfy all of the quantum boundary conditions. . . at which point the transaction is com-
pleted” (1986, p. 662). Many confirmation waves from potential absorbers may converge
on the emitter at the time of emission but the quantum boundary conditions can usually
only permit a single transaction to form. Any observer who witnesses this process would
perceive only the completed transaction, which would be interpreted as the passage of a
particle (e.g. a photon) between emitter and absorber.
There are in fact two complementary descriptions of the transaction process lurking
side by side here: on the one hand there is a description of the physical process, consisting
of the passage of a particle between emitter and absorber, that a temporally bound
experimenter would observe; and on the other hand there is a description of a dynamical
process of offer and confirmation waves that is instrumental in establishing the transaction.
This latter process clearly cannot occur in an ordinary time sequence, not least because
our temporally bound observer by construction cannot detect any offer or confirmation
waves. Cramer suggests that the ‘dynamical process’ be understood as occurring in a
“pseudotime” sequence:
The account of an emitter-absorber transaction presented here employs the semantic
device of describing a process extending across a lightlike or a timelike interval of
space-time as if it occurred in a time sequence external to the process. The reader is
reminded that this is only a pedagogical convention for the purposes of description.
The process is atemporal and the only observables come from the superposition of
all “steps” to form the final transaction. (1986, p. 661, fn. 14)
These steps are of course the cyclically repeated exchange of offer and confirmation waves
which continue “until the net exchange of energy and other conserved quantities satisfies
the quantum boundary conditions of the system” (Cramer, 1986, p. 662). There is a
strong sense here that any process described as occurring in pseudotime is not a process
at all but, as Cramer reminds, merely a “pedagogical convention for the purposes of
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description”. The role that pseudotime plays in Cramer’s theory will be of major concern
for us in this analysis and we will see in §7 that the ontological status of Cramer’s posited
pseudotemporal sequence is far from transparent. For now, however, let us consider how
this transaction mechanism underpins Cramer’s transactional interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
4 The transactional interpretation
Cramer utilises the principled framework of the Copenhagen interpretation to charac-
terise his transactional interpretation. Recall that the Copenhagen interpretation can be
characterised in terms of a clutch of core principles, including Heisenberg’s indeterminacy
relation, the Born rule, Bohr’s principle of complementarity and the epistemic reading
of the wavefunction. The purpose of these principled elements is to provide a physical
picture of quantum systems given the formalism of quantum mechanics; Cramer likewise
constructs the transactional interpretation from principles to serve this end.
To begin with, the statistical interpretation of the formalism embodied in the Born
rule remains unchanged from the Copenhagen interpretation. This is a consequence of the
fact that during the transaction process the confirmation wave traverses the very same
spacetime as the offer wave, only in reverse: the amplitude of the advanced component of
the confirmation wave arriving back at the emitter is proportional to the time reverse (or
complex conjugate) of the amplitude of the initial offer wave evaluated at the absorber.
Thus, the total amplitude of the confirmation wave is just the absolute square of the initial
offer wave (evaluated at the absorber), which yields the Born rule. Since the Born rule
arises as a product of the transaction mechanism, there is no special significance attached
to the role of the observer in the act of measurement. The ‘collapse of the wave function’
is interpreted as the completion of the transaction. Thus both the indeterminacy relation
and the principle of complementarity are no longer fundamentally related to the process
of observation but rather dissolve into a single feature of the transaction mechanism: in
satisfying the boundary conditions, the transaction can project out and localise only one
of a pair of conjugate variables.
According to Cramer, the biggest bifurcation between the Copenhagen and trans-
actional interpretations is centred around the physical significance of the wavefunction.
As a function of the principle of complementarity, the completeness of the quantum for-
malism and the need to avert worries about the nonlocality of the collapse process, the
wavefunction according to the Copenhagen interpretation can be thought of as simply “a
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time
B : (xB , t0) S : (x0, t0) A : (xA, t0)
(xB , t1) (xA, t1)
ψo(x, t)
ψcA(x, t)ψcB(x, t)
Figure 1: Offer and confirmation waves in the transactional interpretation
mathematical description of the state of observer knowledge” (Cramer, 1988, p. 228).3 In
contrast, the transactional interpretation takes the wavefunction to be a real physical wave
with spatial extent.4 The wavefunction of the quantum mechanical formalism is identical
with the initial offer wave of the transaction mechanism and the collapsed wavefunction is
identical with the completed transaction. Quantum particles are thus not to be thought
of as represented by the wavefunction but rather by the completed transaction, of which
the wavefunction is only the initial phase. As Cramer explains:
The transaction may involve a single emitter and absorber or multiple emitters
and absorbers, but it is only complete when appropriate boundary conditions are
satisfied at all loci of emission and absorption. Particles transferred have no separate
identity independent from the satisfaction of these boundary conditions. (1986,
p. 666)
Though there is much formal overlap between particular elements of the Copenhagen
and transactional interpretations, Cramer points out that giving objective reality to the
wavefunction “colors all the other elements of the interpretation” leading to a vastly
different physical picture of the quantum world. Let us consider this physical picture
with a concrete example.
Consider a radioactive source, S, sitting between two absorbers, A and B, constrained
3Cramer’s reading of the Copenhagen interpretation in this respect is somewhat contentious. The
“knowledge interpretation” of the wavefunction is claimed to be an integral element of the Copenhagen
interpretation by Heisenberg (1955) but this may be in conflict with the way Bohr envisaged the wave-
function. See Howard (2004) for an excellent discussion of this issue.
4Recent work by Kastner (2010) and Kastner and Cramer (2010) suggests a potentially improved
reading of the transactional interpretation where the wavefunction is considered as “residing in a ‘higher’
or external ontological realm corresponding to the Hilbert space of all quantum systems involved”. This
is an interesting and potentially fruitful avenue for avoiding the problems I outline below concerning
Cramer’s realistic interpretation. I unfortunately do not take account of this improved reading here.
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to emit a single β-particle either to the left or to the right (Figure 1). According to
the transactional interpretation, the process of β-particle emission can be described in
terms of offer and confirmation waves, the initial offer wave being the wavefunction of
the quantum mechanical formalism. The wavefunction “is a real physical wave generated
by the emitter, and travels through space to the final absorber as well as to many other
spacetime loci and many other potential absorbers” (1986, p. 667). Thus at the time of
emission, t0, an offer wave is produced which propagates towards each absorber as well as
forwards and backwards in time. Upon being stimulated by this offer wave at time t1, the
absorbers A and B each produce a confirmation wave that propagates backwards in time
(among other directions) to the radioactive source; the amplitude of each confirmation
wave evaluated at the source is proportional to the modulus squared of the amplitude
of the offer wave evaluated at the respective absorber (i.e. |ψci(x0, t0)| ∝ |ψo(xi, t1)|
2
for i = A,B). These confirmation waves provide the emitter, so to speak, with a Born
probability measure over which the likelihood of each particular transaction occurring can
be quantified. In the same way that the absorber responds to the initial offer wave, the
emitter responds to this subsequent confirmation wave and this cycle continues.
Let us say that the transaction is completed between the radioactive source and ab-
sorber A, i.e. a four dimensional standing wave emerges between S at t0 and A at t1.
The components of the wavefunction which permeate the spatiotemporal regions that are
not between S at t0 and A at t1 do not “disappear”. Rather these components “are only
virtual in the sense that they transfer no energy or momentum and participate in no trans-
action”. Moreover, “the emergence of this transaction does not occur at any particular
location in space or at some particular instant in time, but rather forms along the entire
four-vector that connects the emission locus with the absorption locus” (1986, p. 667).
This four dimensional standing wave is then interpreted as the emission of a β-particle to
the left by S at t0 and the subsequent absorption of this β-particle by A at t1.
The transactional interpretation of the quantum formalism allows the resolution of
some of the most worrying aspects of the Copenhagen interpretation. Since we do not
require the disappearance of the initial wavefunction upon completion of the transaction,
the transactional interpretation alleviates the need to resort to an epistemic interpreta-
tion of the wavefunction, which Cramer (1988, p. 228) finds “intellectually unappealing”,
to account for the nonlocality associated with wavefunction collapse.5 In addition, the
transactional interpretation subverts the dilemma at the core of the EPR argument (Ein-
stein et al. (1935)) by permitting the simultaneous reality of incompatible operators: the
5See fn. 3.
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wavefunction, according to the transactional interpretation,
brings to each potential absorber the full range of possible outcomes, and all have
“simultaneous reality” in the EPR sense. The absorber interacts so as to cause one
of these outcomes to emerge in the transaction, so that the collapsed [wavefunction]
manifests only one of these outcomes. (1986, p. 668).
Most importantly, however, the transactional interpretation employs both retarded and
advanced waves, and in doing so admits the possibility of providing a ‘zigzag’ explanation
of the nonlocality associated with entangled quantum systems. The boundary condi-
tions that influence the formation of a completed transaction include both those at the
emitter as well as the future absorbers. It is this feature that makes the transactional
interpretation a retrocausal model of quantum mechanics. Moreover, it is this feature
that enables the combination of two or more local influences to yield a nonlocal influ-
ence, which restores Lorentz covariance to the description of the behaviour of entangled
quantum systems.
While it at least appears as though the transactional interpretation goes some way
to resolving the interpretational issues of the Copenhagen interpretation, it is in fact not
without its own points of contention.
5 Maudlin’s objection
Maudlin (2002) outlines a selection of problems that arise in Cramer’s theory as a result
of the pseudotemporal account of the transaction mechanism: processes important to the
completion of a transaction take place in pseudotime only (rather than in real time) and
thus cannot be said to have taken place at all. Since a temporally bound observer can
only ever perceive a completed transaction, i.e. a collapsed wavefunction, the uncollapsed
wavefunction never actually exists. Since the initial offer wave is identical to the wave-
function of the quantum formalism, any ensuing exchange of advanced and retarded waves
required to provide the quantum mechanical probabilities, according to Maudlin, also do
not exist. Moreover, Cramer’s exposition of the transaction mechanism seems to suggest
that the stimulation of sequential offer and confirmation waves occurs deterministically,
leaving a gaping hole in any explanation the transactional interpretation might provide
of the stochastic nature of quantum mechanics. Although these problems are significant,
Maudlin admits that they may indeed be peculiar to Cramer’s theory. Having said this,
Maudlin also sets out a more general objection to retrocausal models of quantum me-
chanics which he claims to pose a problem for “any theory in which both backwards and
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β
(i)
S AB
β
(ii)
Figure 2: Maudlin’s thought experiment
forwards influences conspire to shape events” (2002, p. 201).
Maudlin’s main objection to the transactional interpretation hinges upon the fact that
the transaction process depends crucially on the fixity of the absorbers “just sitting out
there in the future, waiting to absorb” (2002, p. 199); one cannot presume that present
events are unable to influence the future disposition of the absorbers. Let us consider
Maudlin’s own thought experiment designed to illustrate this objection. Consider again
our radioactive source constrained to emit a β-particle either to the left or to the right.
To the right sits absorber A at a distance of 1 unit. Absorber B is also located to the
right but at a distance of 2 units and is built on pivots so that it can be swung around
to the left on command (Figure 2(i)). A β-particle emitted at time t0 to the right will
be absorbed by absorber A at time t1. If after time t1 the β-particle is not detected at
absorber A, absorber B is quickly swung around to the left to detect the β-particle after
time 2t1 (Figure 2(ii)).
According to the transactional interpretation, since there are two possible outcomes
(detection at absorber A or detection at absorber B), there will be two confirmation waves
sent back from the future, one for each absorber. Furthermore, since it is equally probable
that the β-particle be detected at either absorber, the amplitudes of these confirmation
waves should be equal. However, a confirmation wave from absorber B can only be sent
back to the emitter if absorber B is located on the left. For this to be the case, absorber
A must not have detected the β-particle and thus the outcome of the experiment must
already have been decided. The incidence of a confirmation wave from absorber B at the
emitter ensures that the β-particle is to be sent to the left, even though the amplitude
of this wave implies a probability of a half of this being the case. As Maudlin states so
succinctly, “Cramer’s theory collapses”.
It is clear to see that this challenge to retrocausality must be considered seriously if
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a proposed retrocausal mechanism is to be successful. The key challenge from Maudlin
is that any retrocausal mechanism must ensure that the future behaviour of the system
transpires consistently with the spatiotemporal structure dictated by any potential future
causes: “stochastic outcomes at a particular point in time may influence the future, but
that future itself is supposed to play a role in producing the outcomes” (2002, p. 197). In
the transactional interpretation the existence of the confirmation wave itself presupposes
some determined future state of the system with retrocausal influence. However, with
standard (i.e. forwards-in-time) stochastic causal influences affecting the future from
the present, a determined future may not necessarily be guaranteed in every such case, as
shown by Maudlin’s experiment. Before we go on to examine this objection in more detail,
let us first consider some responses that have been put forward in defence of Cramer’s
theory.
6 Cramer defended
I wish to examine here three specific defences of the transactional interpretation due to
Berkovitz (2002), Kastner (2006) and Marchildon (2006). A review of these defences will
not only provide a good exercise in exploring the details of the transactional interpretation,
but will assist us in getting to the source of the issues highlighted by Maudlin’s challenge.
Maudlin’s objection has been formulated by Berkovitz (2002) in terms of the vary-
ing conceptualisations of the probabilities involved in the experiment. More specifically,
Berkovitz believes that the deviation between the long-run frequencies of measurement
outcomes and their objective probabilities is at the core of the objection. Berkovitz de-
fends the transactional interpretation by showing that causal loops of the type found in
Maudlin’s experiment need not obey the assumptions about probabilities that are com-
mon in linear causal situations. To illustrate this claim about causal loops, Berkovitz
considers a simple coin toss.
Let the event P be the tossing of a fair coin, and let this be an indeterministic cause
of event Q, the coin landing ‘heads’. Let event R be the perception of the coin landing
‘heads’ deterministically caused by event Q. Since the coin is fair, the long-run frequency
of event Q with respect to event P is 1
2
. However, if one considers the long-run frequency of
event Q with respect to both P and R, then this frequency is 1; every time event P occurs
with event R, Q must have occurred. The probability of event Q with respect to P and
R is called by Berkovitz a biased probability. Berkovitz argues that within causal loops
of the type found in Maudlin’s experiment the probabilities are always biased. Thus one
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should not expect the long-run frequencies to correspond with any unbiased probabilities;
there is no inconsistency in a deviation between these quantities.
This example can be translated in a straightforward manner to the language of Maudlin’s
experiment. Event P is the radioactive β-decay, event Q (indeterministically caused by
P) is the emission of the β-particle to the left and event R (deterministically caused by Q)
is the detection of the β-particle on the left. Recall that an integral element of Maudlin’s
objection is that the existence of the confirmation wave on the left ensures event Q, but
the information contained within the confirmation wave itself suggests event Q has a
probability of only 1
2
. With respect to only event P, event Q has a long-run frequency of
1
2
, but with respect to both P and R this biased probability is 1. It is not inconsistent for
these quantities to deviate, therefore Berkovitz claims Cramer’s theory is not inconsistent.
Berkovitz does not consider Cramer’s pseudotemporal account of the transaction mech-
anism significant, preferring to think of the cycle of offer and confirmation waves in terms
of causal connections which are part of a four dimensional block universe. While Berkovitz
has claimed to show the legitimacy of the causal loop in Maudlin’s experiment, by over-
looking Cramer’s pseudotemporal account of the transaction mechanism Berkovitz has
neglected to address exactly how the pseudotemporal account can be consistent with the
four dimensional block universe. Berkovitz returns to the transactional interpretation in
his (2008) where he recognises that the pseudotemporal account of the transaction mech-
anism jeopardises the explanatory value of the theory. However, the ontological nature of
the transaction mechanism is once again left to one side in his analysis.
Kastner (2006) has expanded on Berkovitz’ approach with a view to eliminating pseu-
dotime from the transactional interpretation. Kastner begins by noting that in the trans-
actional interpretation a complete set of absorbers is not necessary; it is possible for no
confirmation wave to be received from the left of the radioactive source in Maudlin’s ex-
periment. Kastner differentiates between the initial states of the radioactive source in
the two situations where (i) a confirmation wave is received from both the right and the
left absorbers (absorbers A and B respectively), and (ii) a confirmation wave is received
from only the right absorber (absorber A only). It is clear that if a confirmation wave is
received from both the left and right then it is the case that the β-particle will be emit-
ted to the left. Recall that Maudlin claims this to be inconsistent with the information
contained in the confirmation wave from the left.
In a similar fashion to the analysis of Berkovitz, Kastner emphasises the disparity
of probabilities as the heart of Maudlin’s objection to the transactional interpretation.
However, given the initial state, according to Kastner, this disparity can be explained.
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The probability of emission to the left in the case where a confirmation wave is received
from both the left and the right is 1
2
according to the information contained in each
confirmation wave. However, the probability of this being the initial state of the emitter
is also 1
2
since there are two equally probable initial states. Thus, using the standard
probabilistic expression, the probability of emission to the left given the initial state is
P (L& ψ)
P (ψ)
=
1
2
1
2
= 1,
where L is emission to the left and ψ is the initial state.
These two initial states of Maudlin’s experiment can be imagined, according to Kast-
ner, as belonging to two distinct worlds, which share only the offer and confirmation
waves between the emitter and absorber A in common. Kastner proposes that the incip-
ient transaction corresponding to the offer and confirmation waves between the emitter
and absorber A can be thought of as an unstable bifurcation line between the two worlds.
The success or failure of this transaction determines which world the system “enters”.
Suppose the incipient transaction between the emitter and absorber A fails. If this is the
case, absorber A does not detect the β-particle and absorber B is swung around to the
left where it is now able to emit a confirmation wave. What would otherwise have been
a null outcome becomes a realised transaction.
Kastner points out that this account must “abandon the idea that there is cyclic
‘echoing’ between absorber B and the emitter if such echoing is taken as reflective of an
uncertainty in outcome” (2006, p. 14). The failure of the bifurcating transaction, i.e. that
between the emitter and absorber A, makes the outcome of emission to the left certain.
Moreover, the information contained in the confirmation wave received from absorber B
indicates a probability of a half of this being the case. This is not inconsistent due to the
above analysis and, in fact, shows that each confirmation wave reflects the probability
structure across both possible worlds, demonstrating the holistic structure of quantum
mechanics.
Marchildon (2006) proposes another defence of the transactional interpretation against
Maudlin’s objection. He begins by supposing another absorber, say C, is situated on the
left of the radioactive source in Maudlin’s thought experiment at a distance larger than
that of absorber B from the source. If this is the case, then the emitter will receive a
confirmation wave from absorber C on the left and Maudlin’s experiment will proceed
as usual. Marchildon then proposes removing absorber C and considering the absorption
properties of the long distance boundary conditions. If it is postulated that the universe
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is a perfect absorber of all radiation then the presence of absorber C is irrelevant; a
confirmation wave from the left will always be received by the radioactive source at the
time of emission and it will encode the correct probabilistic information. This enables
the transactional interpretation to remain consistent in Maudlin’s experiment. On the as-
sumption that the universe is a perfect absorber, the transactional interpretation correctly
predicts that the β-particle will be emitted to the left half of the time. It remains the
case, however, that the transaction is completed with absorber B only if it is situated on
the left. According to Marchildon, “although the confirmation wave coming from the left
originates from the remote absorber just as often as it originates from B, the transaction
is never completed with the remote absorber” (2006, p. 12).
Although there is a varied focus to each of these defences of Cramer, it is clear that the
problematic element of the transactional interpretation is the causal structure of the pseu-
dotemporal account of the transaction mechanism. In the next section I offer an analysis
of Maudlin’s experiment according to this pseudotemporal account from the perspective
of the block universe model. In doing so I hope to show why Maudlin’s experiment still
poses a problem for Cramer’s theory despite these defences. The underlying problem is
that Cramer’s theory fails to provide a sufficient causal structure to constrain uniquely
the behaviour of the system. While I think Maudlin has successfully isolated this short-
coming, in §8 I challenge his justification for why this is the case in the transactional
interpretation.
7 Maudlin’s experiment in four dimensions
The central claim with which Berkovitz and Kastner are concerned is the disparity between
the probability of emission to the left as determined by the amplitude of the confirmation
wave from the left absorber and the expected probability given that a confirmation wave
arrives from the left. Above I characterised Maudlin’s objection in a different manner:
Maudlin’s key challenge is that any retrocausal mechanism must ensure that the future
behaviour of the system transpires consistently with the spatiotemporal structure dictated
by any potential future causes. An instructive way to analyse the causal structure of
Maudlin’s experiment is four dimensionally.
Consider once again Maudlin’s experimental setup and let us imagine a β-particle
emission to the right (i.e. towards absorber A) according to the transactional interpreta-
tion. Figure 3 represents that part of the transaction process that occurs in pseudotime (a
sort of ‘space-pseudotime’ diagram). An offer wave is emitted from the radioactive source
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Figure 3: Maudlin’s thought experiment according to the transactional interpretation
at time t0. If we initially ignore the conditional nature of the event structure of the exper-
iment, we can imagine this offer wave stimulating two confirmation waves from absorbers
A and B, each confirmation wave originating from the respective potential absorber posi-
tions in spacetime. The particular transaction process we are considering determines that
a four dimensional standing wave emerge between absorber A at time t1 and the source S
at time t0, which is interpreted as the emission of a β-particle at S and the absorption of
this particle at A. The passage of the β-particle, whose four-vector emerges atemporally
over the entire locus of the transaction, is a process of spacetime while the transaction
mechanism itself is a process of pseudotime. If we now consider the conditional nature of
the event structure in time, due to the absorption event at absorber A, absorber B will
remain on the right. Curiously the four dimensional ‘space-pseudotime’ block contains an
event structure (i.e. absorber B swinging to the left) which the four dimensional space-
time block does not. Both absorber A and absorber B vie in pseudotime to participate in
the completed transaction but, once the transaction emerges for one absorber only, the
standing wave that is formed is a standing wave in spacetime. We should acknowledge at
this point that Cramer attempts to alleviate such a worry by suggesting pseudotime to
be “a pedagogical convention for the purposes of description” (see §3).
However, this worry is nonetheless compounded by Cramer’s insistence that the initial
offer wave, identical to the wavefunction of the quantum formalism, is a real wave that
propagates through space. Recall that the components of this offer wave that do not
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participate in any eventual transaction are described by Cramer as “virtual” in that they
transfer no energy or momentum. What Cramer fails to account for is the fact that these
virtual components do contribute something quite important to the transaction mecha-
nism: a putative causal structure. The role that is played by those components of the
wavefunction that are not emitted in the direction of the eventual absorber is to stimu-
late virtual confirmation waves which in turn provide the emitter with the relevant Born
probability measure over all future possibilities. This potential causal influence, however,
originates from a ‘space-pseudotime’ event structure that is not necessarily representative
of the event structure in the future of the quantum system; the probability measure is
constrained by objects that may not physically be there! There is then something very
strange in claiming that the virtual cycles of offer and confirmation waves play a causal
role in constraining the event structure of spacetime. There seems to be a mismatch
between the causal structure dictated by the initial conditions and the causal structure
dictated by the actual evolution of the system which turns on the obscure ontological
status of the pseudotemporal process.
Maudlin’s objection is a potent one; the pseudotemporal account of the transaction
mechanism in the transactional interpretation resists straightforward clarification. This
somewhat complicates the defences examined in the last section, particularly those of
Berkovitz and Marchildon. Berkovitz does consider the cycle of offer and confirmation
waves between emitters and absorbers in the context of a four dimensional block universe
(2002, p. 242), but does so without considering the reality of these entities within the
spacetime block. By playing an important role in the transaction mechanism, the offer
and confirmation waves have causal significance in Berkovitz’ causal loops. However, it
is this causal significance that is called into question by Maudlin’s objection rather than
the consistency of the causal loops.
In contrast, Marchildon eschews any causal significance of the pseudotemporal offer
and confirmation waves by assuming the universe to be a perfect absorber; there will al-
ways be some confirmation wave returning to the source at the time of emission from every
direction, which can play the role of providing the Born probability measure. However,
this does not do justice to the pseudotemporal account of the transaction mechanism.
Recall that “the emergence of [the completed] transaction does not occur at any partic-
ular location in space or at some particular instant in time, but rather forms along the
entire four-vector that connects the emission locus with the absorption locus”. Thus the
emergence of the completed transaction just is the emission of the β-particle, the passage
of the β-particle from emitter to absorber and then the absorption of the β-particle, all
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together. The emergence of the transaction is not the emission event. Therefore the
perfectly absorbing universe cannot stand in for absorber B on the left because spacetime
only contains completed transactions and completed transactions are, by construction,
complete four-vector particle trajectories.
Perhaps Kastner is on the right track by attempting to eliminate pseudotime from the
interpretation by eliminating the dependence of the transaction mechanism on the position
of all the possible absorbers. The resulting view of bifurcating worlds, however, is meta-
physically rather strange. Indeed, in some sense there may be a correspondence between
Kastner’s portrayal of bifurcating worlds and the above adoption of ‘space-pseudotime’
diagrams. There certainly seems to be a need to account for a multitude of event struc-
tures precipitated by the pseudotemporal account of the transaction mechanism. I in-
timated above that this counterfactual feature of the transaction mechanism is at odds
with Cramer’s insistence on a real wavefunction. One might argue, if one was that way
inclined metaphysically, that these facets of the interpretation can be made coherent by
allowing for bifurcating worlds such as Kastner’s.
Unless one were that way inclined, however, Maudlin’s objection remains damaging. I
do not, though, consequently follow Maudlin in thinking that “any theory in which both
backwards and forwards influences conspire to shape events will face this same challenge”.
Recall that the selection of problems introduced in §5 that Maudlin thought peculiar
to Cramer’s theory arose as a result of the pseudotemporal account of the transaction
mechanism. These problems are intimately linked, I think: the pseudotime heuristic and
the reality of the wavefunction are difficult to reconcile. As we have just seen, however,
a more significant worry is the underconstrained nature of the behaviour of the system.
Maudlin believes this to be endemic to retrocausal theories in general. I contend that it
is the lack of causal symmetry in Cramer’s theory that is to blame here.
8 Causal symmetry
The pseudotemporal account of the transaction mechanism that Cramer provides, while
retrocausal in the sense that it contains both retarded and advanced influences, is not
time symmetric. The initial offer wave always precedes (pseudotemporally) the other pro-
cesses of the transaction and thus the initial conditions of a quantum system described
by the transactional interpretation have primacy over any other boundary condition in
constraining the dynamics. This is instrumental in rendering the pseudotemporal account
of the transaction mechanism problematic. The varying event structures associated with
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different possible outcomes of a single stochastic event that we encountered above would
not arise if the transaction mechanism endowed both the retarded and advanced elements
of the transaction with equivalent causal significance. To do so would amount to con-
straining the transaction mechanism from both temporal ends and this, in turn, would be
enough to constrain the event structure uniquely in spacetime.
Indeed, Maudlin suggests something along these lines as the key to a successful retro-
causal theory:
If the course of present events depend on the future and the shape of the future is in
part determined by the present then there must be some structure which guarantees
the existence of a coherent mutual adjustment of all the free variables. (2002, p. 201)
Thus due to the causal asymmetry of the pseudotemporal account of the transaction
mechanism, the retarded and advanced elements of Cramer’s theory demonstrably do not
have a structure which guarantees the existence of a coherent mutual adjustment of all
the free variables.
Maudlin realises that this failure to provide a coherent mutual adjustment of free
variables is indeed the cardinal problem of the transactional interpretation, but suggests
that the reason for this is simply because it is retrocausal. According to Maudlin, in
theories without retrocausation (which Maudlin, following Bell, calls ‘local’ theories),
solutions to the field equations at a point are constrained only by the values of
quantities in one light cone (either past or future) of a point. Thus in a deterministic
theory, specifying data along a hyperplane of simultaneity suffices to fix a unique
solution at all times, past and future of the plane. Further, the solutions can be
generated sequentially: the solution at t = 0 can be continued to a solution at t = 1
without having had to solve for any value at times beyond t = 1. Thus the physical
state at one time generates states at all succeeding times in turn. . .
[In a stochastic theory] fixing the physical state in the back light cone of a point
may not determine the physical state there, but it does determine a unique proba-
bility measure over the possible states such that events at spacelike separation are
statistically independent of one another. . . The present moment makes all of its ran-
dom choices independently and then generates the probabilities for the immediate
future, and so on. (2002, p. 201)
He continues,
Any theory with both backwards and forwards causation cannot have such a struc-
ture. Data along a single hypersurface do not suffice to fix the immediate future
since that in turn may be affected by its own future. The metaphysical picture of the
past generating the future must be abandoned, and along with it the mathematical
tractability of local theories. (2002, p. 201)
Maudlin’s argument against retrocausality can thus be construed as follows:
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(i) retrocausal theories must have a structure which guarantees the coherent mutual
adjustment of free variables;
(ii) local theories are mathematically tractable and fit a metaphysical picture of the
past generating the future because solutions to the field equations require only data
along a single hypersurface;
(iii) data along a single hypersurface are not sufficient for a retrocausal theory to guar-
antee the coherent mutual adjustment of free variables;
(iv) therefore, retrocausal theories must abandon both the metaphysical picture of the
past generating the future and with it mathematical tractability.
There are multiple reasons to be wary of this argument, which we will address here in
turn. As a starting point, let us consider the claim that retrocausal theories must have
a structure which guarantees the coherent mutual adjustment of free variables and that,
because of this, retrocausal theories will be underdetermined by the data along a single
hypersurface. Insofar as this is the case, the transactional interpretation can be seen as
an attempt to achieve the former but with a failed mechanism for remedying the latter.
The failure of the transactional interpretation to achieve this, however, is not because it
is a retrocausal theory, rather, as indicated above, it is because it lacks causal symmetry
in its pseudotemporal account of the fundamental quantum causal mechanism. I made
the suggestion above that temporal symmetry could be achieved by the transactional
interpretation if both initial and final boundary constraints were employed. It should
now be clear that if such constraints were present in the formalism of a retrocausal theory
then this would also debase any underdetermination claim; an increase in the available
data would suffice to determine uniquely the behaviour of the system. It is not the
case that such a retrocausal theory would, despite Maudlin’s declaration to the contrary,
elicit the abandonment of mathematical tractability; we will explore this further in just
a moment. A related concern, however, is that it is not entirely clear that Maudlin’s
underdetermination claim should worry us in the first place.
8.1 Causality and determination
Consider Maudlin’s reasoning that, in a retrocausal setting, data along a single hypersur-
face do not suffice to fix the immediate future since that in turn may be affected by its
own future. If such a feature of retrocausal theories cannot guarantee the coherent mu-
tual adjustment of free variables, then by symmetry so should the temporal reverse of this
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Figure 4: Determination and causation in (i) ordinary forwards-in-time causal theories
and (ii) retrocausal theories. The black arrows indicate determination and the dashed
arrows indicate what we would like to think of as causal influences in those cases.
reasoning fail to guarantee the coherent mutual adjustment of free variables in ordinary
forwards-in-time causal cases, i.e. data along a single hypersurface should not suffice to
fix the immediate past since that in turn may be affected by its own past.6 This is clearly
not correct. In a deterministic theory, data along a single hypersurface are sufficient to
determine a unique solution to the field equations and thus determine the behaviour of
the system at all times, past and future. Thus the data at some time t0 determine not
only the data at t−1 but also the data at t−2, which is normally thought to have a causal
influence on the data at t−1 (see Figure 4(i)). We see quite clearly here that the data
at t−2 is not an independent condition of the sort that could stymie the coherent mutual
adjustment of free variables. By the same token the data at t0 determine not only the
data at t1 but also the data at t2, which in a retrocausal setting can be thought to have a
causal influence on the data at t1 (see Figure 4(ii)). We can now see just as clearly that
the data at t2 is likewise not an independent condition of the sort that Maudlin claims
renders retrocausal theories underdetermined.
It appears as though Maudlin’s mistaken underdetermination claim emerges from a
manifest tension between the temporal asymmetry of his “metaphysical picture of the
past generating the future” and the temporal symmetry of determination in which “data
along a hyperplane of simultaneity suffices to fix a unique solution at all times, past and
future of the plane”. The tension stems from the distinctly causal notion of “generation”
in Maudlin’s metaphysical picture in contrast to the “fixity” of a unique solution in his
characterisation of determinism. We can alleviate this tension with a more carefully
constructed picture of reality.7 If we characterise causality as a perspectival notion built
upon an interventionist account of causation, we find that we are able to strike a harmony
between our causal intuitions, such as deliberation, and the intuition that future events
6See also Evans, Price and Wharton (forthcoming) for the same point.
7See Price and Weslake (2010) and Evans (2010) for a more detailed exposition of this picture.
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are fixed within a deterministic framework by realising that we, as spatiotemporally bound
agents, are constrained in our epistemic access to the events in spacetime. The key to this
picture is that our limited epistemic access to both the effects of our actions, on the one
hand, and the complete causal past of our deliberations, on the other, allow us to believe
that our ‘free’ actions play a role in bringing about (or causing) the consequences of our
actions. With such a picture in mind, we are able to attribute both t−2 and t2 with causal
significance insofar as we are ignorant of the complete data at t−1 and t1 respectively and
at t0. If we then utilise this surrogate picture to reconcile causality and determinism we
can see by the above reasoning that Maudlin’s argument for underdetermination loses
some of its authority.
8.2 A tractable alternative
The details of this surrogate picture also arise in the context of another of Maudlin’s
claims. Let us for argument’s sake grant that the underdetermination problem of retro-
causal theories must be remedied and return to Maudlin’s argument that doing so renders
these theories mathematically intractable. Consider the Schro¨dinger equation, the wave
equation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics: it is an example of an equation that re-
quires only data along a single hypersurface to fix a unique solution. This is because it
is first-order in time. If we consider the Klein-Gordon equation, which is second-order in
time, we see that it requires twice the initial data to determine a solution. Ordinarily
solutions to this classical scalar field equation are found by imposing two independent
initial boundary conditions: the solution to the field equations at some particular time
as well as the first time derivative of this solution. According to Wharton (2010), the
Klein-Gordon equation has resisted interpretation as a relativistic quantum mechanical
wave equation partly due to this increase in required initial data. Wharton makes the
suggestion that a time symmetric approach to quantum mechanics can provide a natu-
ral resolution to this interpretational obstacle. Rather than imposing two independent
initial boundary conditions on solutions to the Klein-Gordon equation, one can impose
two boundary conditions at two different times. This can be interpreted as supplying the
field equations with data along two different instantaneous hypersurfaces or, likewise, as
determining the behaviour of any system described by the Klein-Gordon equation with
initial and final constraints. This causal symmetry, of course, is just the suggestion made
above for overcoming Maudlin’s underdetermination claim targeting retrocausal theories.8
8As well as Wharton (2010), see also Sutherland (2008) for an example of a retrocausal theory with
a symmetric causal structure.
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Within Wharton’s time symmetric scheme the full solution to the field equations
cannot be known before any final constraint becomes epistemically accessible. The initial
and final boundary conditions can be pictured as representative of consecutive external
measurements on some quantum system. Without knowledge of the later measurement
to be performed on the system one cannot solve the field equations and thus one cannot
know the exact state of the system between the measurements. What one can know before
the later measurement, however, is some best approximation to the full solution based on
the initial data and it seems reasonable to think this would be the ordinary wavefunction
of the Schro¨dinger equation. This then yields a ‘hidden variable’ theory of sorts where
the wavefunction of the quantum formalism is interpreted as representing an observer’s
knowledge of the system and the full solution to the Klein-Gordon equation is interpreted
as representing the actual state of the system, hidden from the observer. Upon measuring
the system the observer gains knowledge of the final constraint and can retrodict the
intervening state based on the now attainable full solution to the Klein-Gordon equation.
This careful attention to the epistemic limitations of the spatiotemporally bound observer
is just the same principle that buttresses our surrogate picture from above.
Moreover, such a retrocausal scheme for modelling quantum processes seems by no
means ‘mathematically intractable’; on the contrary, not only do we have a straightfor-
ward algorithm for calculating the properties of any particular quantum system but we
also have a clear metaphysical prescription, whose limitations reflect our limitations as
spatiotemporally bound observers, for representing this system. We have seen that the
metaphysical picture that Maudlin ties to mathematical tractability, that of the past gen-
erating the future, is abandoned trivially within any retrocausal scheme but this evidently
does not imply that we must also abandon mathematical tractability. Indeed, by empha-
sising this traditionalist metaphysical picture of reality, it seems as though what Maudlin
has in mind when he says ‘mathematical tractability’ is something commensurate with
a particular form of initial value problem. Retrocausal theories of quantum mechanics
aside, if we look toward some of our more established physical theories we see that there
is little justification for this characterisation of mathematical tractability.
8.3 Classical tractability
In the first place, the representation of the dynamical behaviour of classical physical sys-
tems according to analytical mechanics certainly does not preclude all but an initial value
metaphysics. Granted, the Hamiltonian formulation of dynamics appears to provide good
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support for this metaphysical picture: the dynamical arena of Hamiltonian mechanics,
phase space, is a space of possible initial values with a geometric structure that allows the
determination of a unique dynamical path given any single point in the space. However,
when one considers how this geometric structure is derived from the formalism of analyti-
cal mechanics, one finds that this Hamiltonian picture is merely (as Lanczos (1970) points
out) a “remarkable simplification” of a deeper dynamical picture. The geometric structure
of phase space is encoded in Hamilton’s equations of motion and, according to Lanczos,
there are two ways that these equations can be derived. The first way is to decompose
the second-order Lagrangian equations of motion into two first-order equations that can
be transformed into Hamilton’s equations by application of a Legendre transformation.
The Lagrangian equations themselves are attained by way of the variational (or action)
principle: the Lagrangian equations are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
action integral to remain stationary under arbitrary variations of the configuration of the
system given the initial and final configurations of the system. Thus it would seem that
the Hamiltonian formulation might indeed be built upon temporally symmetric boundary
conditions.
The second way of deriving Hamilton’s equations of motion, however, observes that
since the Legendre transformations are completely symmetric there is no requirement
that we must take the Lagrangian formulation of mechanics as primary. As such, one
can formulate Hamilton’s equations directly without the Lagrangian equations nor the
Legendre transformations (Lanczos, 1970, p. 169). However, to do so one must produce
a new action integral in terms of an extended set of independent variables and subject it
once again to a variational principle; Hamilton’s equations become the conditions for a
stationary action integral under arbitrary variations which are again constrained by initial
and final boundary conditions. Regardless then of how one constructs the geometry of
Hamiltonian phase space, the fundamental element of analytical mechanics remains the
specification of initial and final boundary conditions as part of the variational principle.
Thus it appears as unlikely that one might find justification for Maudlin’s characterisation
of ‘mathematical tractability’ in analytical mechanics.
The case of general relativity is not so clear cut. On the one hand, it is more than
reasonable to take the central lesson of general relativity to be that the fundamental on-
tological unit of our reality is a four dimensional solution to Einstein’s field equations;
solutions are clearly not obtained in Maudlin’s ‘mathematically tractable’ way.9 On the
other hand, though, considerable effort has been spent over the last half a century at-
9See Brown (2005, §9.2.2) for a discussion of this point.
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tempting to cast general relativity in a form that explicitly separates out a single temporal
dimension from three spatial dimensions10, which would appear the best hope for a justi-
fication of Maudlin’s metaphysical picture: as long as a spacetime is globally hyperbolic,
a solution can be generated from data on any Cauchy surface. However, a new difficulty
arises herein: due to the foliation invariance of such formulations of general relativity
there exists a troublesome indeterminacy problem. Not only does specification of a single
3-geometry (of which a phase space point is comprised when combined with the relevant
canonically conjugate momentum variable) fail to determine uniquely a dynamical path
but, as Pooley (2001) points out, “the specification of an initial sequence of 3-geometries
is not sufficient to allow us to predict which continuation of the sequence will be actual-
ized” (emphasis added). This indeterminacy may not be as pernicious as it first appears,
since it is a function of gauge freedom, and thus every actualised sequence represents
the same spacetime sliced in different ways. However, at the level of hypersurfaces, data
along a single hypersurface is insufficient to determine a unique continuation in its im-
mediate future.11 It is up for grabs then whether or not general relativity fits Maudlin’s
characterisation of ‘mathematical tractability’.
9 Cramer’s missing structure and Maudlin’s misdirected metaphysics
Maudlin’s inventive thought experiment exposes a deep problem within Cramer’s theory:
the causal structure of the transaction mechanism cannot constrain uniquely and consis-
tently the behaviour of particular quantum systems. I claim that what the transactional
interpretation is missing is a causally symmetric account of the transaction mechanism:
that is, both initial and final boundary constraints with equal causal significance influ-
encing the dynamics of the system. Such a causally symmetric mechanism would serve
to ensure the coherent mutual adjustment of all the relevant free variables. In contrast,
Maudlin attributes this shortcoming of the transactional interpretation to the inability of
a retrocausal theory to supply a structure that could achieve such mutual adjustment of
variables. Moreover, Maudlin claims that the inability of retrocausal theories to achieve
this is due to a fundamental incongruence between retrocausality and his “metaphysical
picture of the past generating the future”. This picture underpins his underdetermination
challenge to retrocausal theories and his notion of mathematical tractability.
I hope to have shown that we have good reason to be wary of Maudlin’s metaphys-
10See, for instance, Dirac (1958), Bergmann (1961), Arnowitt et al. (1962) and Barbour (1994).
11This is related to the thin and thick sandwich problems; see Baierlein, Sharp and Wheeler (1962)
and Wheeler (1964).
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ical picture and its connection to mathematical tractability. Firstly, Maudlin’s under-
determination challenge to retrocausality can be subverted if one is careful to spell out
the metaphysical difference between causality and determination; Maudlin’s picture ev-
idently does not achieve this. Secondly, we saw an example of a retrocausal theory of
quantum mechanics that does not encounter any problems with mathematical tractabil-
ity, despite not adhering to the edict of Maudlin’s picture. Thirdly, it seems unlikely that
analytical mechanics, and possibly general relativity, can be used to support an initial
value metaphysics, despite being arguably the best place to begin looking for mathemat-
ical tractability in physical theories. At the very least we can conclude from this that
Maudlin’s picture cannot be used as strongly as he may have liked as an objection against
retrocausality.
The transactional interpretation, and Maudlin’s critique, does show us something
important: for retrocausality to be taken seriously in contemporary physics, it must be
supported by a coherent picture of reality and, above all, this picture would do well to be
causally symmetric.
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